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Author(s): Paul Russell Anderson

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National Security in the Postwar World

By PAUL RUSSELL ANDERSON

EVERY nation deserves security, based on the doctrine of sovereign equality. Every nation desires security, since it makes possible all other cultural values. What is more, every nation demands security, for its very existence is dependent upon it. One of the searching issues facing this generation is that of how to provide security for each nation at the same time that comparable security is made available for all.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY *vs.* NATIONAL SECURITY

There are those who believe that we should give exclusive attention to plans for collective security since this alone brings national security. There are, on the other hand, those who argue that we should emphasize a strong, independent plan for national security since collective security is at best a profession of faith. There is a growing number of people who feel we must work for collective security wherever possible, but also develop our own plan for defense and that these activities are correlative, not antithetical. Of one thing we in America are certain: we shall not again be caught unaware and unprepared. We shall preserve the peace in co-operation with others if we can, but we shall be prepared to defend ourselves alone if need be. This is good sense.

The danger of too exclusive preoccupation with collective security is that we may lose touch with tangible forces. The danger of overemphasis upon our own defense is that we may lose sight of the obvious ideal—the common security of mankind. We must find a balance between co-operative agreement and independent action. We must in good

faith enter into common agreement with other nations and restrict our own plans for defense so as not to attract suspicion. We must also keep our own bastion of defense sufficiently strong so as to protect our rights and fulfill our obligations, even alone if necessary. To do all of this at once is not easy. Even a carefully developed balance may not prevent another war; in any event this is the only real hope we have for peace.

ISOLATION IMPOSSIBLE

America has long depended upon natural water barriers as the chief line of defense. We have not been alone in this but we have been outstanding. With thousands of miles of water separating us from other great continents we have inherited a spirit of isolationism. The difficulty with isolationism is not that it is unpatriotic but rather that it is outmoded; we in fact have no island fortress, not even a remote island, any more. We are part of an active, interdependent world. Our contacts are close. With modern airpower developed even further than it is today, we may well expect that geographical contact will be easier with European powers in the future than it has been between New York and New Orleans in the past. Space has been conquered by modern science. There are still natural hazards, but there are no insuperable physical obstacles keeping nations apart from one another. This fact is basic to any realistic appraisal of America's plans for security.

Time, as well as space, is less of an obstacle to intercourse between nations than before. The art of warfare as practiced in the present conflagration is adequate testimony to what can be done in a few days. Think back to the early

conquests of Hitler in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere. Remember the quick landing in Normandy, the short final conquest of Germany, the terrific battering given the cities of Japan in a few days—these facts remind one of the mastery over time which is ours. The manufacture of weapons is a complicated process, although we are constantly increasing our production tempo; the destruction which these can effect overnight is appalling. With new weapons, ever more destructive, being developed, the potential annihilation of a city or a nation in a day or a week becomes easier. Combine the spatial and temporal factors in the creation of a weapon such as the robomb and you can readily realize that no nation, unprepared, can long survive the concentrated attack of an armed opponent. If time has thus become an element of offense, it must likewise be made a part of the strategy of defense. No longer can we permit it to be said “Too little and *too late*.”

Industrialization is not a completed phenomenon. Further advanced in America than elsewhere, its benefits are such as to demand continuation of expansion for decades to come both here and abroad. Industrialization increases the demand for raw materials and this in turn necessitates wider and more entangling economic contacts. Industrialization has also made possible wider distribution and this, too, adds to our foreign economic ties. Properly speaking, there is no economically independent nation in the world. Russia and the United States come closest to achieving this objective but even they suffer from prolonged separation from markets. Economically speaking, what happens elsewhere has its impact on what happens here. We cannot escape the implications of our growing contacts with the rest of the world.

With our relationships to other na-

tions bound to increase rather than to decrease we can no longer be unconcerned about what other nations do. Likewise we must realize that what we do has its proportionate effect upon others. We cannot “live alone and like it.” We cannot even live alone. We are members of a community with all the moral rights and duties which such membership imposes. We must devise effective techniques for the handling of our common problems, or we must acknowledge the certainty of further wars. The first plank, therefore, in any program of national security is that of peaceful collaboration.

SALIENT FEATURES OF CHARTER

The United Nations Charter devised at San Francisco provides the framework in which co-operative security measures must now be viewed. It is not to be assumed that this is a perfect document. Revision and expansion may later be in order but provision is made for this. The Charter is realistic without being cynical; it is idealistic without being utopian. It offers real hope for group action by nations, great and small, toward the elimination of those forces which lead to war and against the aggressor if all peaceful means of adjudication fail.

The Charter is a considerable improvement over the Covenant of the League of Nations. One of its real contributions is the establishment of an Economic and Social Council whose objectives are to study those economic and social ills from which wars develop and to keep the new international instrument constantly informed concerning the real “sore spots” on the globe. This Council is instructed to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress; to promote solutions of international economic, social, health, and other related problems, and educa-

tional co-operation; to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights, without distinction as to race, language, religion, or sex. It can summon international conferences on economic, social, and humanitarian problems. It is expected to study conditions of international trade and the problem of raw materials. It can recommend to the Assembly legislation having to do with problems in its sphere. The creation of such a Council is a decidedly progressive step in increasing the means for peaceful resolution of common social problems.

A second important development in the new Charter is provision for a Trusteeship Council, based on stated principles governing the administration of territories containing dependent peoples. This statement of principles pledges the administering nations to promote, not only the improvement of social conditions, but also self-government and ultimate independence. It is well to note that this section applies to the peoples in colonies as well as to those in trusteeship territories. Again, the creation of a Trusteeship Council to carry out these objectives offers a real juridical basis for the handling of certain hazardous interracial and international problems.

A third decisive improvement over the Covenant of the League of Nations is the acceptance by each nation of an obligation to use a portion of its armed power to enforce peace under the direction of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. Article 10 of the League of Nations was weak. There are some who believe the present Charter is also weak. There is, however, good reason to believe that the present statement is sufficiently strong that when it becomes defined in terms of concrete responsibility it will be effective in preventing aggression—at least for this we must hope.

There are, of course, criticisms which

can be made of the Charter. Some of these may be obviated at a later date; others may be unworthy or retracted. The most general criticism which has been made is that the Security Council is undemocratic and that the whole organization is run by the big powers. This criticism is more valid on the basis of principle than it is on the basis of realistic appraisal of the problem. Power is not equally divided in the world and there is little to be accomplished by talking as if it were. Power will maintain the peace and power must be found where it is. Whether this balance (or imbalance) in the Security Council will have good or bad results will depend entirely on the integrity of the nations concerned.

THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD

The new Charter may well have been ratified by the United States before this article appears. We will have then pledged our allegiance to the use of international instrumentalities for the handling of disputes between nation and nation. Whether or not the new organization is effective will depend entirely upon the attitude of the member states, particularly that of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and China. The people of the United States muffed the ball over twenty years ago; there seems to be firm desire on the part of the entire nation that we not make the same mistake again, that we co-operate to the hilt in orderly international arrangements, even that we accept positive leadership in so doing.

Practically speaking, this means that we shall need a Department of State properly manned for this task. No policy of watchful waiting will be adequate. We shall need men of broad understanding and vision to represent us in every contact abroad. We shall need a clearly defined policy in advance of possible eventualities and men who are

able to present and defend this policy with reasonableness and conviction and yet who know the art of compromise. In short, if we are to play the part in world affairs which we can and should play, we shall have to overcome our traditional reticence on the international scene and replace it with a dynamic foreign policy in line with the basic principles of the new Charter. Only as we take every step possible to make the new organization effective will we be discharging our accepted responsibilities. A defeatist attitude stirred up by disillusioned perfectionists and extreme nationalists (what strange bedfellows!) may be dangerous; honest reservations as to the outcome of the new venture in collaboration are healthy and in turn provocative of worthy improvement and the creation of positive safeguards.

Granted, then, that our first line of national security is honest and faithful collaboration, most Americans are today asking the question, what shall be done in case this first line of defense fails? This is a proper question. It deserves the most thorough consideration of thoughtful minds. Only when we have given attention to the problem of national security in its entirety and have made concrete plans in terms of this over-all picture will we have a right to say that we have found even a temporarily satisfactory answer to the problem.

FURTHER STEPS UNITED STATES MUST TAKE

Military security rests fundamentally upon knowledge of likely conflicts with proper advance preparation for them. Our first necessity, therefore, is an adequate intelligence service which can keep us at all times adequately informed of military, economic, and political developments elsewhere. Those who argue for a large reserve of manpower do so

partly on the basis that we may expect a surprise attack from any quarter. Granted that even the best intelligence service may not have prior knowledge of all eventualities, certainly the better the service the less likely the surprise. Before the war we were far understaffed in such activities and this has been well known abroad. Adequate attention to this problem would do much to give us advance notice of what degree and amount of military preparation is needed. No precisely calculated policy of military demands can be formulated in advance of knowledge of the probable conditions of battle—climatic, geographic, topological, and so forth. No nation in the world is capable of continuous preparation for mass activity under all possible circumstances even if it were maintained as an armed camp. The result is that constant vigilance in seeking knowledge of the plans and policies of other nations is almost the barometer of military need. To know what is likely is to save wasteful expense in manpower and production. Pearl Harbor probably could not have been avoided, but who knows but that the destruction might well have been minimized if there had been adequate listening posts and active air reconnaissance?

Scientific development

Another important plank in any platform for national security is concerned with scientific development and research. Even an elementary knowledge of the progress of this war will provide convincing testimony of the importance of scientific achievement as an implement of war as well as of peace. Thousands of scientific minds have worked day and night, in this country and elsewhere, improving and refining the machinery necessary for the successful prosecution of war in a mechanical age. New developments such

as radar have had an incalculable importance in saving life and in conquering the enemy. So important is scientific advance that it is almost a truism to say that the nation which excels in this area, other factors being relatively equal, holds the key to victory in any war. No wonder, then, that one of our first steps in planning for the postwar period is consideration of setting up a research board to co-ordinate all scientific activity concerned with security; announcement of the details of this plan will probably have been made before the publication of this article.

Scientific advance has a threefold importance in a plan for security. It develops the latest and best instruments of war. It enriches the life of a nation and hence makes it strong internally. It also serves as a silent warning to any possible aggressor, for where scientific pre-eminence exists there also is to be found the greatest *potential* instrument of war. To further our already significant record in scientific achievement is to possess strength within and potential power without, even when scientific genius is not directly engaged in planning for war.

Industrial production

Dependent upon scientific development as a means of national security is our industrial capacity; in fact, industry is merely applied science. In molding an adequate program for national security we must not lose sight of the tremendous significance of industrial production. We felt this deeply at the beginning of the war when we had men but not implements. The conversion of machinery was a more complicated process than the conversion of manpower. We have since seen what can be done in modern warfare with adequate supplies and matériel. Our victories in the Pacific are, of course, great tributes to the valor of individual men; more re-

cently we have come to realize how important the physical instruments of war are and how saving in manpower they may become. Continuous analysis of our productive capacity and the natural resources at our disposal are essential for adequate defense. It should be added that this analysis must include diagnosis of the entire problem of conversion lest the next time we enter a war, if such be our misfortune, we repeat the mistakes of the present one.

DISPOSITION OF MANPOWER

All of this leads to one final plank in the platform of military security, namely, the need for adequately trained manpower. Two considerations must here be kept in mind. One is that in modern warfare we need increasingly specialized personnel (involving longer training), and the other is that manpower without immediately available matériel is practically useless. The first of these suggests the need for a professionally trained military force, whatever the size. The second argues for a program of training geared to our productive capacity for military purposes.

Adequate military force

Both of these considerations have implications for the present discussion of universal military training. A professionally trained military force is essentially a *competently* trained military force. Competence depends upon ability and the length of training program necessary to develop facility in operation. In the United States, our first demand will be for a military force adequate to fulfill our commitments under the United Nations Charter. Unquestionably, we will think it wise to maintain a standing force somewhat larger than this, depending upon the size of other national military establishments and upon the trend of international affairs. As a rule of thumb, we

need a military force large enough to meet our obligations for collective police duty plus a highly mobile force strong enough at any one time to meet the possible urgencies of that date, with a sufficiently large reserve force to meet less likely eventualities of the future. For better or for worse, we are all reconciled to a larger permanent military force than we have ever had before, particularly in terms of air force and navy personnel since these are the first arms of defense. Just what size our military force should be must be determined through further deliberation on our commitments and needs. But that we must have such a force is clear and that it must be extremely well trained in the use of the latest instruments of war is equally obvious. Consideration of this permanent military establishment is related to the discussion of universal military training on two bases: (1) the larger the permanent force, the less the necessity or desirability for universal military training, and (2) the more highly specialized the services, the more carefully planned any program of temporary civilian training must be if it is effective at all in terms of relating this training to real military needs.

Universal military training has been proposed by the Army and Navy as a necessity for adequate military protection. The plan, as explained later in this volume, will affect practically three-fourths of our male youth by taking a year out of their lives for military training. Whether or not we should have compulsory military training depends upon numerous factors: our military demands, our relations with other nations, the plans of other nations, the total effect upon our culture, and a consideration of other possible means for securing trained manpower. It is no slight departure from traditional American policy in peacetime, and must therefore receive wide and serious discussion.

For those who are inclined to oppose universal military training, it is important to give consideration to other positive proposals for securing trained manpower. For those who urge adoption of universal military training now, it is important to justify this as the best means for the training of personnel, and also to establish why the decision need be made at this time in view of the tremendous reserve power we shall have at the end of the war.

Adequate civilian resources

The possibility of universal military training must be viewed in the light of the existence of a permanent military force of determined size and in relation to other factors in an adequate program for national security. Trained manpower is important, but trained manpower involves a variety of types of training dependent upon the function performed. We must not overlook training for highly specialized civilian pursuits for which there is an exact counterpart in the military services—medicine, dentistry, and certain types of engineering, for example. We have done poorly in conserving our supply of technical and scientific specialists in this war, and recently have practically closed off the flow of men into these fields by ill-advised policies discontinuing deferments; even the Axis countries have shown more concern for the continuance of a flow of trained specialists than we. This must certainly be given more favorable consideration in planning for our security in the postwar period.

The problem of manpower is not concerned with mass armies as such in modern warfare; the problem is essentially one of securing *adequately trained* personnel equipped with an *abundant supply* of the weapons of war. We must, therefore, never lose sight of the importance of matériel in our discussion of training, for trained men are but

targets if they lack adequate weapons. Our plans for security should seek to keep in proper ratio the factors of men and matériel.

MORALE

An oft neglected factor basic to national security is that of morale. Men fight to win, but they fight because they have stakes in the battle. These stakes, however they may be phrased, are essential ingredients of our national culture. Slogans such as "the war to save democracy" and the "war to end wars" have not been as prevalent in this war as in the last, but the cultural distinction between the warring parties has been in fact much more apparent this time. Great issues have been at stake, and the issues have been worth fighting for because they were great. This is but a way of saying that only as we have common belief in certain basic moral concepts are we likely to have that courage and valor in defense of country which a vital conflict demands. In order finally to be strong in external relations we must be strong within. Tanks and planes and ships are instruments of war. Trained men control the instruments. But conviction and will control men. These are forces, indirect as they may seem to be, which play a prominent part in the final result of war as well as in any other significant human enterprise.

National security, therefore, has far broader implications than purely military ones. The ends of life are peaceful ones. We dare not sacrifice the ends of peaceful democratic society for a false numerical or quantitative plan for security even though we recognize that we must have physical power to give strength to our moral objectives. But we must somehow return to a civilian world as rapidly as possible, give time to the rectification of social ills and to the enriching of our culture, for herein lie the fruits of democratic living. It can also be said that the more we can do this and the less we need in the way of direct military preparation, the more solid our national morale will be. Let us do what we have to do in the way of protecting ourselves from threats abroad; let us not create threats before they exist. Let us be *potentially* powerful, based on strength of character as well as on military might.

It is not easy to have your cake and eat it too, but it is not impossible in this instance. We must make our life more abundant in peace, but we must be alert to the dangers of war. The first must be accomplished without pious self-satisfaction; the second must be achieved without creating false suspicions or fears. To such a line we must try to hew, for with it lies the greatest possibility of both security and peace.

*Paul Russell Anderson, Ph.D., is President of Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh. He has taught philosophy and served in administrative capacities in institutions of higher learning both here and abroad. This past year he was Special Consultant with the American Council on Education, Washington, D. C. Along with other writings he is co-author of *Philosophy in America from the Puritans to James* (1939). He is a frequent contributor to periodicals.*